I'm not sure about that. You see Wellington's great skill was knowing when to fight. He took a small force against an enormous one on the Peninsular. The french military presence there was huge, even if Napoleon wasn't there himself. As a result much of Wellington's campaign involved lots of marching and counter marching and picking his moments precisely. If Napoleon turned up at the head of however many men, I'm pretty sure Wellington would have denied Napoleon the chance to bring his full force to bear.
(also, shout out to my bro Nelson! The most pivotal victory in British history, a loss would have collapsed the Empire overnight and seen Britain invaded by overwhelming numbers)
Not at all accurate. Whilst Nelson's battle was significant because of the scale, the French invasion fleet had already been sunk in a storm. Made up of shitty barge type ships that couldn't handle a storm. That pretty much ended all Napoleon's dreams of an invasion of Britain. Trafalgar was simply the final nail in the coffin. But arguably the Nile was of far greater significance because it cut Napoleon off and destroyed the French Med fleet.
From wiki, it doesn't mention the storm that destroyed the transport ships but I've read it from several other sources:
This plan was typical of Napoleon in its dash and reliance on fast movement and surprise, but such a style was more suited to land than to sea warfare, with the vagaries of tide and wind and the effective British blockade making it ever more impractical and unlikely to succeed as more and more time passed. Only the Toulon force eventually broke out (on 29 March 1805) and, though it managed to cross the Atlantic, it did not find the Brest fleet at the rendezvous and so sailed back to Europe alone, where it was met by the force blockading Rochefort and Ferrol (where invasion vessels had been prepared), defeated at the Battle of Cape Finisterre and forced back into port. Therefore, on 27 August 1805 Napoleon used the invasion army as the core of the new Grande Armée and had it break camp and march eastwards to begin the Ulm Campaign. Thus, by the time of the battle of Trafalgar on 21 October, the invasion had already been called off, and so this battle further guaranteed British control of the Channel rather than preventing the invasion. The comment attributed to Admiral John Jervis - "I do not say they [the French] cannot come - I only say they cannot come by sea" - had been proved right.[8]